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This paper shows that a manufacturer may benefit from parallel trade. In addition to an 
intuitive condition about the effect of demand shocks, this occurs when competitive retailers 
must order inventories before they know the realization of demand and for products whose 
sale value drops at the end of the demand period. For these types of products, letting retailers 
trade unsold inventories generally results in larger orders placed with the manufacturer, 
higher manufacturer profit and higher consumer surplus. The model provides a simple 
explanation as to why the volume of parallel trade is now very large and accepted by 
manufacturers for some products such as automobiles, clothes, toys, consumer electronics, 
musical recordings, cosmetics and perfumes. 
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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that circumstances exist under
which it pays a manufacturer to allow distributors (hereafter called retailers)
to engage in parallel trade, that is trade that is not directly controlled by the
trademark, copyright or patent owner, generally the manufacturer himself.
Moreover, we show that under these circumstances parallel trade￿ sometimes
also referred to as gray markets￿ is typically welfare improving.
These results arise when four conditions are met. The ￿rst two are about
the nature of the product: retailers must place orders before they know the
state of demand, and the products have little value at the end of the demand
period (or equivalently, it is costly to maintain them as inventories). The
other two conditions are about the demand: the states of demand must be
di⁄erent across markets, and di⁄erent states of demand a⁄ect the quantity
demanded rather than consumer￿ s willingness to pay for the products.
There are several markets for which these conditions are met. In the
markets for automobiles, motorcycles and clothes manufacturers have to in-
troduce new models frequently. In the toy market, products have very narrow
and well-de￿ned demand periods (e.g., pre-Christmas season). In all these
cases, the value of the products decreases signi￿cantly at the end of the de-
mand period. Moreover, many goods are not produced on a just-in-time
inventory basis and exploiting scale economies often requires signi￿cant lags
between production and sales. In other words, orders must be placed well
before the relevant demand period. This often leads to errors in forecasting
the future strength of demand and thus ex post to incentives to ship unsold
inventories to markets where demand turns out to be higher than expected.
To understand why a manufacturer may have an incentive to allow this
type of parallel trade, suppose he does not and is able to e⁄ectively ban
parallel trade. Retailers may then be stuck with signi￿cant unsold invento-
ries, in which case they have a strong incentive to lower prices. Competition
among retailers might even force the price down to zero, since inventories are
essentially sunk investments. But if they anticipate a possible loss, retailers
will be reluctant to order large inventories. Banning parallel trade may thus
be detrimental to the manufacturer￿ s pro￿tability. Allowing parallel trade,
on the other hand, may provide a simple mechanism to keep retail prices
from falling dramatically when the state of the demand turns out to be low
and thus give retailers an incentive to place larger orders than they other-
wise would. This is not a trivial issue since parallel trade provides additional
1sales opportunities for those retailers that can export but at the same time
lowers those of retailers that face competition from imports. We hence must
show that parallel trade leads to larger total orders. The four conditions
mentioned above make sure that this is indeed the case and that parallel
trade raises the manufacturer￿ s pro￿t over a wide range of parameters. Also
note that our reasoning does not rely on an insurance argument￿ we assume
throughout that retailers are risk neutral.
Is there evidence that manufacturers like parallel trade? Data on parallel
trade are notoriously hard to come by, simply because trade statistics do not
distinguish between authorized and unauthorized intermediaries (Maskus,
2000). However, the volume of parallel trade has simply become too large
to argue seriously that manufacturers either do not know of its existence or
know about it but are unable to stop it even if it lowers their pro￿tability. In
other words, manufacturers must bene￿t from parallel trade at least in some
markets.1 This view is held by several experts. For instance, Lipner (1990,
p.4) writes ￿[..] some manufacturers, while publicly opposed to gray market
sales of their products, privately do little to inhibit their ￿ ow and in some in-
stances even go so far as to encourage these transactions.￿Similarly, a report
prepared for the EU Commission (NERA, 1999, p.11) states ￿[s]ome parallel
trade, however, seems to be bene￿cial to the trademark owner. [..] If, for
example, there is for some reason over-production in the source country, and
the manufacturer would otherwise be left with an unsold stock, parallel trade
may be a means to raise pro￿ts through additional sales. Another example is
goods such as clothing which are subject to fashion waves. Previous season￿ s
clothing in one country can still yield useful revenues in other countries￿ .
Furthermore, a ￿dealer might [..] have over ordered, or might have excess
quantities of an older or out-of-date version of the goods￿(Lipner, 1990, p7).2
The North American automobile market is a good case to keep in mind.
Retailers selling new automobiles must sign a contract with manufacturers
forbidding them to re-sell these cars in other countries. Yet over 200,000
1In the US, parallel imports were estimated to be worth $7-10 billions in the mid-
1980s (Cespedes, Corey and Rangan, 1988); today, estimates of $20 billion can be found
(Computer Reseller News, 2001). In Europe, the volume of parallel imports varies from
5% of sales in markets like appliances, motorcars and consumer electronics to nearly 15%
for musical recordings, cosmetics and perfumes (NERA, 1999) and to even 25% in the UK
motorcycle market (House of Commons, 1999).
2See also Cespedes et al. (1988), Computer Reseller News (2001), and House of Com-
mons (1999).
2vehicles intended for the Canadian market were resold south of the border
in 2001 (up from 16,000 in 1996; see Automotive News, 2002). Obviously,
this no-parallel-trade clause is not enforced despite the fact that retailers face
heavy penalties.3 Parallel imports arise in this market in part because of the
quota system adopted by most North American manufacturers. Retailers
receive a pre-determined volume allocation per model in order to force them
to sell a minimum number of cars without restricting retail prices.4 The
consequence is often a mismatch between demand and supply creating strong
incentives for parallel trade between Canada and the US especially when
a particular model sells well in one country and not in the other.5 The
automobile producers could easily eliminate this unintended trade. The fact
that they do not indicates that they are not particularly hurt by this trade.6
The existing literature on parallel trade has mainly focused on the is-
sue of price discrimination (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994; Richardson, 2002;
Maskus and Chen, 2002). This literature generally ￿nds that manufactur-
ers want to avoid parallel trade, because it interferes with their ability to
segment markets and set di⁄erent prices in di⁄erent countries.7 The welfare
e⁄ects of allowing parallel trade in these models are generally ambiguous,
simply because the elimination of price discrimination may or may not be
welfare improving (Tirole, 1988). We see our explanation of the role of par-
3Interestingly, this clause seems to have rarely been tested in court.
4This huge increase in parallel imports is also due to wholesale pricing policies adopted
by the automobile producers in the two countries. Canadian dealers apparently bene￿t
from lower prices than their US counterparts, because they are located in a generally
thiner, weaker and more price elastic market (Automotive News, 2002).
5￿When a customer wants a car that the dealer cannot supply, the dealer has two
choices [...], they can turn the customer away or they can source the car from a Canadian
exporter [...]. When a new luxury car hits North American dealer lots, it can generate
year-long American waiting lists; [in Canada], they just sit on the lot￿(Financial Post,
2001).
6Other examples of parallel trade arise from the fact that particular models are not
distributed in one country (see Automotive News, 2004a and World IT Report, 2003), or
that manufacturers deliberately oversupply certain markets to keep a presence there. For
instance, Mercedes-Benz wanting to keep a presence in Barbados systematically ships too
many cars there that are typically re-exported to the UK. According to House of Commons
(1999), this implies that the manufacturer consents to parallel trade.
7Knox and Richardson (2002) show, however, that a foreign monopoly may bene￿t
from parallel trade when a country chooses both its tari⁄ level and whether to allow
parallel trade. Ahmadi and Yang (2000), Cosac (2002) show that parallel imports may
also bene￿t manufacturers when they are perceived as di⁄erent products with respect to
the authorized products.
3allel trade not as a substitute to this story but as a complement. In our
model, the manufacturer￿ s incentive to allow parallel trade is particularly
strong when the price elasticity of demand is similar across countries but
there is uncertainty about the actual size of demand. However, if there are
signi￿cant (permanent or random) di⁄erences in the price elasticity of de-
mand across markets, a manufacturer has every incentive to keep markets
segmented in order to practice (third degree) price discrimination. The man-
ufacturer hence typically faces a trade-o⁄￿ at least for the products that
satisfy our conditions￿ between prohibiting parallel trade to practice inter-
national price discrimination and allowing parallel trade to get retailers to
order more inventory. This may explain why the North American automo-
bile manufacturers insist on a no-parallel-trade clause in their contracts with
dealers, but do not always enforce it.8
Finally, our approach shows that a key to understanding parallel trade
is to consider whether the incentives faced by manufacturers and retailers
are aligned or not. When they are aligned, as in our paper, there is no
need for manufacturers to impose (or enforce) no-parallel-trade clauses in
their contracts with retailers. In this sense, the present paper brings the
economic literature on parallel trade closer to the legal (including law and
economics) literature where parallel trade is mainly viewed as a contractual
issue between manufacturers and intermediaries (see Lipner, 1990; Gallini
and Hollis, 1999).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate the
main points of the paper with the help of a simple model. Section 3 contains
a general model and proofs of the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Simple Model
Consider a risk-neutral monopoly manufacturer selling to a continuum of
risk-neutral retailers in two di⁄erent countries, denoted A and B. In turn
these competitive retailers sell to consumers. Retailers must deal with two
8Threatening retailers may be enough to limit parallel trade while secretly tolerating
it. It is only during periods of very signi￿cant retail price di⁄erences between the US
and Canada (whether due to a low Canadian dollar or to a demand boom in the US
as during the 1999-2001 period) that manufacturers start enforcing the no-parallel-trade
clause. Today the volume of parallel trade in this market has slowed down considerably
(Automotive News, 2004b).
4key characteristics of the market: ￿rst, they must order and take possession
of inventories before demand becomes known, and second, inventories left
unsold at the end of the demand period have no value. Retailers face a con-
stant unit cost of distribution that we normalize to zero. The manufacturer￿ s
production cost is also assumed to be zero, as is the trade cost; this implies
that we do not need to specify in which country the manufacturer is located.
We denote the volume of realized sales in country i by qi. The volume
of realized sales may di⁄er from the volume ordered from the manufacturer,
denoted by xi, if after the realization of demand some goods are reexported
or inventory is left unsold. Demand in country A is deterministic and given
by the inverse demand function pA = 1 ￿ qA. The inverse demand function
in B is pB = 1 ￿
qB
s , where the random variable s takes the value of 1 if
demand is high and ￿ < 1 if demand is low. The low state of demand occurs
with probability ￿. We have picked these demand functions to illustrate two
points. First, parallel imports in our model occur even if the manufacturer
does not price-discriminate between markets. In fact, a monopolist selling
directly to consumers would set the same price in the two markets. Second,
parallel imports may go in both directions, even if one country has a larger
market than the other and/or one country has deterministic demand.
The game we study has the following order of moves. The manufacturer
￿rst announces a wholesale price wi for each market i = A;B and whether
retailers have the authorization to engage in parallel trade. The retailers then
order inventory and, after observing the true realization of demand, decide
where and how much to sell at the market-clearing price.
2.1 No Parallel Trade
We ￿rst derive the benchmark solution when the manufacturer does not
authorize the competitive retailers to ship any inventory to the other country
(no parallel trade). In this case, the two markets are completely segmented
and equilibrium is the same as the solution to the ￿ exible price game analyzed
by Deneckere et al. (1997). It is straightforward to show that, in market A,
^ pA = ^ wA = 1=2; ^ qA = ^ xA = 1=2 and the manufacturer￿ s pro￿t is b ￿
m
A = 1=4.
Consider now market B. Competitive retailers have every incentive to
put whatever volume they have ordered on the market at whatever price the
market will support, as the product has no value (or is prohibitively costly
to store) once the the demand period has ended. In particular, the retail
price may e⁄ectively drop to zero when the demand turns out to be low.
5Hence there are two possibilities when the demand is low: the retail price
may be positive or equal to zero. Of course, this will depend on the level
of the wholesale price: if it is high enough, inventories will tend to be low
leading to a positive retail price. To uncover the circumstance under which
the retail price may fall to zero when the demand is low, consider each case
separately.









xB + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ xB)xB ￿ wBxB: (1)
If the retail price in B falls to zero in the low demand state (maxf0;1￿
xB
￿ g =
0), the representative retailer earns positive revenue only when the demand
is high. Since in equilibrium the retailer￿ s expected pro￿t is necessarily equal
to zero, xB = 1 ￿
wB
1￿￿. The manufacturer then chooses wB to maximize
￿
npi
B = wBxB. The solution is b wB = 1￿￿
2 , implying an order volume of
b xB = 1
2(= ^ xA), a retail price in the state of high demand of b ph
B = 1
2, and a
low-demand retail price of b pl
B = 0. In the high-demand state retailers sell
their entire inventory, i.e., b qh
B = 1
2. Realized sales in the low-demand state
are equal to b ql
B = min(￿; 1
2). Hence, the manufacturer sets a low wholesale
price in order to induce retailers to order the level of inventory that would
be optimal if demand turned out to be high.
If the retail price in B is positive irrespective of the state of the demand
(maxf0;1 ￿
xB
￿ g = 1 ￿
xB
￿ ), xB =
￿(1￿wB)
￿(1￿￿)+￿ ensures that the representa-
tive retailer makes zero expected pro￿t. The manufacturer then chooses
~ wB = 1
2 to maximize his expected pro￿t. This implies that ~ xB = ~ qB =
￿
2(￿(1￿￿)+￿) (< ^ xA), ~ ph
B =
2(￿(1￿￿)+￿)￿￿
2(￿(1￿￿)+￿) (￿ ^ pA) and ~ pl
B =
2(￿(1￿￿)+￿)￿1
2(￿(1￿￿)+￿) (￿ ^ pA).
Hence the manufacturer sets the same ￿ high￿wholesale price he would if de-
mand were certain to be high, but accepts that the inventories are lower than
in country A and therefore too low when demand turns out to be high.
When the manufacturer does not authorize parallel trade, his optimal
strategy in B is straightforward. Comparing pro￿ts, he chooses a high whole-
sale price, e wB = 1
2; when he expects the demands in the two states to be rela-
tively similar (1￿￿
2￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1) and he chooses a low wholesale price, b wB = 1￿￿
2 ;
otherwise (￿ < 1￿￿











2￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
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We now consider the case where the manufacturer allows the retailers to
engage in parallel trade. The direct e⁄ect is to provide retailers in B with
an opportunity to sell unsold inventories in A when demand is low. But this
would mean more competition for retailers in A. Hence, the possibility of
having to compete with parallel imports from B implies that retailers in A
also face random (residual) demand and may end up re-exporting part of
their inventory when demand in B turns out to be higher than expected.
Hence even with demand shocks in only one country, parallel trade may take
place in either direction.
Below, we denote the volume of parallel trade originating in B by mj,
where j = h;l denotes the state of demand in B. It should be clear that
when demand in B is low (j = l), parallel trade necessarily goes from B to
A (ml > 0). However, when the demand in B is high (j = h), parallel trade
could potentially originate in B (mh > 0) or in A (mh < 0). Sales in A in
the presence of parallel trade are equal to xA + mj, and sales in B are given
by xB ￿ mj.
The expected retail pro￿t in B when mh > 0 is then equal to
E￿
r

























If mh < 0, the expected retail pro￿t in B is
E￿
r

















)xB ￿ wBxB: (4)
We assume that the di⁄erence in demands that triggers parallel trade between













= 1 ￿ (xA + m
h):










7Substituting (5) into (3) or (4) and setting the representative retailer￿ s pro￿t
to zero, the relationship between wholesale price and order volume such that
the representative retailer expects zero pro￿t is
wB = 1 ￿
1 + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
2(1 + ￿)
(xA + xB); (6)
irrespective of the direction of parallel trade.
Using the same reasoning as above, it is easy to verify that the relationship
in country A between wA and xA + xB is identical to (6). This means that
the wholesale price in each country depends on the manufacturer￿ s overall
shipment only and that wA = wB. Of course, this is due to the assumption
that parallel trade equalizes retail prices across countries. As a result, we can
only determine the total volume of orders that maximizes the manufacturer￿ s
overall pro￿t, ￿pt = wB(xA+xB), where wB is given by (6). It is easy to show
that this overall pro￿t is maximized for ￿ wB = 1
2 irrespective of the expected
demand in B. This results in an overall shipment of ￿ X = 1+￿
(1+￿+￿(1￿￿)) and a




2(1 + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
: (7)
Hence, comparing (2) and (7), we obtain
Result 1: The manufacturer￿ s expected overall pro￿t increases with paral-
lel trade if demand in the low-demand state is not too low (￿ > 1￿￿
3￿￿) and
decreases otherwise.
Figure 1 illustrates the manufacturer￿ s total equilibrium pro￿t as a func-
tion of ￿ with and without parallel trade. Except at ￿ = 1, parallel trade
raises the manufacturer￿ s pro￿t when the retail price in B remains positive
even when demand is low (corresponding to ￿ > 1￿￿
2￿￿ in Figure 1). This is also
the case when the retail price in B drops to zero in the low-demand state,
at least if ￿ > 1￿￿
3￿￿. The reason why parallel trade raises the manufacturer￿ s
pro￿t can be seen most easily in the case where ￿ > 1￿￿
2￿￿. Since wholesale
prices are the same with and without parallel trade, the increase in pro￿t
clearly comes from the fact that retailers overall order more inventory when
parallel trade is authorized. The same e⁄ect is at work if 1￿￿
3￿￿ < ￿ < 1￿￿
2￿￿:
parallel trade gives retailers an incentive to order more inventory even with-
out the manufacturer having to reduce the wholesale price (as he would do
in this range without parallel trade). Finally, if ￿ < 1￿￿
3￿￿ ￿ meaning that
8θ 1
Figure 1: Manufacturer's total profit
npt Π
pt Π



















Πdemand in B in the low-demand state is extremely low￿ the e⁄ect of parallel
trade on the overall level of inventory is exactly reversed. While still giving
an incentive to retailers in B to order more, this positive e⁄ect is more than
o⁄set by the fact that parallel trade gives a strong disincentive to retailers
in A who expect to be swamped with parallel imports when demand in B
is low. Hence, the manufacturer wants to prohibit parallel trade, precisely
because he would ship too little inventory overall.
2.3 Welfare
We now investigate the welfare e⁄ects of allowing parallel trade, starting
with the e⁄ect on consumer surplus. Suppose ￿rst that parallel trade is not
allowed and let CS
npt
i denote the expected consumer surplus in country i




domestic consumer surplus in B is













The speci￿c level of expected consumer surplus will depend on whether the
retail price drops to zero when the state of the demand is low. If it does,








Suppose now that parallel trade is allowed, and let CS
pt
i denote expected
consumer surplus in country i. Above, we only found that xA + xB = ￿ X =
1+￿
(1+￿+￿(1￿￿)). Hence, we do not know the volume of orders from each country
and the volume of parallel trade. To compute consumer surplus for each
country, all we need, however, is individual country sales which can be found
in the following way. Suppose demand in B is low. Since parallel trade
equalizes retail prices, it must be true that 1￿
qB
￿ = 1￿qA and thus qA =
qB
￿ .
In addition, parallel trade makes sure that, across the two countries, total
sales must be equal to total orders (i.e., qA + qB = xA + xB). Combining
these two conditions, we get
q
l








when demand in B is low, respectively high. Once we have computed retail




4￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)2
8(1 + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))2 and CS
pt
B =
4￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)2
8(1 + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))2 :
A comparison of expected consumer surplus in the two countries with and
without parallel imports yields the following result.
Result 2: Parallel trade raises expected consumer surplus in country A. It
raises expected consumer surplus in country B provided that the retail price
is positive without parallel trade (￿ ￿ 1￿￿
2￿￿), and reduces it otherwise.
When the demand is very low in the low-demand state, the retail price in
B drops to zero, and this can only bene￿t consumers. Allowing parallel trade
makes this possibility less likely and this e⁄ect is detrimental to consumers.
However, parallel trade also induces retailers to place larger orders, which is
good for consumers. It is this e⁄ect that explains why consumer surplus in
B is higher with parallel trade when ￿ is high enough to guarantee positive
retail prices in all states of demand. Since the retail price never drops to zero
in A, this e⁄ect also explains why consumer surplus in A always increases
with parallel trade. Clearly, allowing parallel trade is pro￿table for the man-
ufacturer exactly for the same reason that consumers in both countries like
it, namely because retailers order more inventory￿ at least for su¢ ciently
high values of ￿.
Finally we turn to world social welfare, W, which consists of the sum
of consumer surplus and the manufacturer￿ s pro￿t (the retailers expect zero
pro￿t): W = CSA + CSB + ￿. Figure 2 illustrates W with and without
parallel trade. We ￿nd:
Result 3: Parallel trade raises expected world welfare if ￿ is su¢ ciently high
(￿ ￿ 1￿￿
2￿￿) and reduces it otherwise.
The key insight is that the interests of consumers and the manufacturer
are often aligned with the kind of parallel trade examined here: when demand
shocks are not too large (￿ ￿ 1￿￿
2￿￿), parallel trade raises both the manufac-
turer￿ s pro￿t and consumer surplus in both countries. This simple result is
in sharp contrast with the conclusions of the literature viewing parallel trade
as a price discrimination issue. Parallel trade in that literature typically pro-
duces a disagreement between consumers and producers on the one hand,



























Figure 2: World social welfare3 Generalization
Consider now a more general speci￿cation of the demand and the distribution
of the demand shock. Let demand in country A be given by the function
DA(p) and demand in B by DB(p;￿), with Di
p < 0, where i = A;B and ￿ 2
[￿
￿;￿
+] is the (non-negative) realization of a random variable with density
f(￿) and cumulative distribution F(￿). We still assume that in the presence
of parallel trade prices are strictly positive for all realizations of demand.
Note, however, that we no longer restrict the market in B to be smaller than
the one in A.
Writing the inverse demand functions as pA = pA(qA) and pB = pB(qB;￿)
and letting m > 0 denote the volume of parallel trade going from B to A,
we can express the expected retail revenue in A, ERr
A, as
R ￿+
￿￿ pA(xA + m)xAf(￿)d￿ if m ￿ 0
R ￿+
￿￿ fpA(xA + m)(xA + m) + pB(xB ￿ m;￿)(￿m)gf(￿)d￿ if m < 0;
(9)
and that in B, ERr
B, as
R ￿+
￿￿ fpB(xB ￿ m;￿)(xB ￿ m) + pA(xA + m)mgf(￿)d￿ if m ￿ 0
R ￿+
￿￿ pB(xB ￿ m;￿)xBf(￿)d￿ if m < 0:
(10)
Since the expected retail pro￿ts, E￿r
i = ERr
i ￿ wixi; i = A;B, must equal
zero, we can write the manufacturer￿ s problem of maximizing the expected





fpA(xA + m)(xA + m) + pB(xB ￿ m;￿)(xB ￿ m)gf(￿)d￿: (11)
The volume of parallel trade, m = m(xA;xB;￿), is the ￿ ow of goods that
equalizes retail prices across the two countries ex post for each level of xA,
xB and ￿. It is implicitly de￿ned by
pA(xA + m) = pB(xB ￿ m;￿): (12)
Suppose that the manufacturer￿ s pro￿t is maximized for m = 0, and let
the corresponding pro￿t-maximizing order volumes be denoted by x￿
A and x￿
B;
also assume, for the time being, that retail prices are non-negative at these
11volumes for all realizations of ￿. Then the derivative of (11) with respect to



















B;￿)gf(￿)d￿ = 0: (13)
That is, the manufacturer will set wholesale prices ex ante so that the volumes
ordered by the retailers, x￿
A and x￿
B, equalize expected marginal revenues in





















B;￿)gf(￿)d￿ = 0: (14)
Ex post, however, when the demand shock has been realized, marginal
revenues may no longer be equalized for x￿
A and x￿























In this case, an ex-post reallocation of output between markets would raise
the manufacturer￿ s expected pro￿t. This can best be seen if we suppose that
the manufacturer could do the reallocation himself, that is if distribution
and production were vertically integrated. For realizations of ￿ for which
MR￿
B(￿) > 0, the manufacturer would ship goods from A to B until marginal
revenues are equalized, thereby raising his ex-post pro￿t. When the realized
value of ￿ is such that MR￿
B(￿) < 0, the manufacturer would not reallocate
goods to A, but sell only enough units in B to make marginal revenue there
equal to zero, leaving some inventory unsold in the process. The ability to
reallocate goods ex post would thus increase the manufacturer￿ s pro￿t for
high values of ￿ and leave pro￿t unchanged for low values. It follows that
from an ex-ante perspective the manufacturer￿ s expected pro￿t would be
higher if he had the option of reallocating goods ex post.
Of course, in the scenario we consider the goods have been sold to in-
dependent retailers. Hence the question is whether simply allowing them to
engage in parallel trade can bring about an ex-post reallocation of goods that
would raise the manufacturer￿ s expected pro￿t. The retailers will carry out
parallel trade whenever there are di⁄erences in retail prices across countries.
Retailers that can sell their goods in another country where prices are higher
gain, those that see retail prices fall due to parallel imports lose. Will the
12aggregate retail pro￿t in the two countries rise for a given realization of ￿
when parallel trade eliminates retail price di⁄erences? The answer is yes, if
for the given ￿ the equalization of retail prices also moves marginal revenues
closer to each other. Otherwise, aggregate retail pro￿t for this value of ￿
falls.
To learn whether (ex-ante) expected aggregate retail pro￿t rises or falls
when parallel trade is allowed, one has to weight ex-post retail pro￿ts with
the density and integrate over ￿. If the expected aggregate retail pro￿t in A
and B rises, then this implies that for given wholesale prices retailers have
to order more inventory in order to keep the zero-pro￿t constraint implied
by perfect competition satis￿ed. This in turn means that the manufacturer￿ s
expected pro￿t, expected consumer surplus (in the two countries taken to-
gether) and therefore also expected world welfare increase. By contrast, if
the expected aggregate retail pro￿t falls when parallel trade is allowed, then
the manufacturer￿ s expected pro￿t, aggregate consumer surplus and world
welfare decrease.
Therefore the crucial question is whether there exist su¢ cient conditions
under which parallel trade raises expected aggregate retail pro￿ts and under
which it lowers them. We prove the following result:
Proposition 1 (a) If DA(p) = D(p) and DB(p;￿) = ￿D(p), and F(￿) puts
su¢ ciently little probability mass on realizations of ￿ for which the retail
price falls to zero without parallel trade, then allowing parallel trade raises the
manufacturer￿ s expected pro￿t, expected world consumer surplus and expected
world welfare. (b) If the inverse demand functions take the form pA = p(q)
and pB = ￿p(q), then permitting parallel trade reduces the manufacturer￿ s
expected pro￿t, expected world consumer surplus and expected world welfare.
Proof: (a) In this case, it is straightforward to show that the price elasticity
of demand, "(p), does not depend on ￿. Hence marginal revenues in A and














i.e. whenever pA = pB. Hence parallel trade, by equalizing retail prices for
every value of ￿, must raise expected aggregate retail pro￿ts. This is true
under the implicit assumption that in the absence of parallel trade retail
prices are non-negative for all realizations of demand.
13Suppose now that without parallel trade the choice of x￿
A and x￿
B causes
the retail price in B to drop to zero for low realizations of demand. In
particular, let ~ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿(x￿
B) be de￿ned by pB(
x￿
B
~ ￿ ) = 0, so that price is zero for
￿ 2 [￿





























f(￿)d￿ = 0: (17)
For any ￿ 2 [￿
￿;~ ￿], goods will ￿ ow from B to A if we allow parallel trade.
This will have no e⁄ect at ￿rst on retailer pro￿ts in B because the price
there is zero. The retailer pro￿ts in A, however, must fall as successive units
are shipped there, since x￿
A was chosen optimally and additional units cause
marginal revenue to become negative. Thus parallel trade may lower ex-post
aggregate retail pro￿t for low values of ￿. For ￿ 2 (~ ￿;￿
+] parallel trade
will raise overall ex-post retail pro￿t for the reasons given in the preceding
paragraph. Hence the overall e⁄ect of parallel trade will depend on the
distribution of ￿. In particular, if there is su¢ ciently little probability mass
on [￿
￿;~ ￿], the expected aggregate retail pro￿t will increase with parallel trade.
(b) In this case one can easily show that an equalization of marginal














and hence almost always results in di⁄erent retail prices. Allowing retailers
to engage in parallel trade necessarily pushes marginal revenues apart in the
two countries for every value of ￿ and hence reduces expected aggregate retail
pro￿t.￿
The proposition shows that the form of demand uncertainty plays a cru-
cial role in determining whether parallel trade is desirable or not.10 One way
9Note that we let pB = pB(
qB
￿ ) be the inverse of DB(p;￿) = ￿D(p).
10The proposition does not depend on whether the retailing sector is perfectly com-
petitive or not. Consider the other extreme of a single retailer in each country. If the
realization of ￿ produces di⁄erent retail prices, the marginal revenue of the retailer lo-
cated in the low-price market on the ￿rst unit shipped to the high price market is equal to
the retail price in that market (and thus necessarily higher than the marginal revenue of
selling this unit in his home market). Not surprisingly this means that the ￿ ow of parallel
trade goes in the same direction as in the presence of a competitive retailing sector. More
importantly, this implies that parallel trade raises (lowers) the manufacturer￿ s expected
14to interpret the demand shock in (a) is to assume that consumers in both
countries have identical individual demand functions, but that the manu-
facturer does not know how many consumers there will be for his product.
Hence, at any given price, the price elasticity of demand is the same across
the two countries, but the manufacturer does not know how much he will sell
at that price. Both manufacturers and retailers have the same incentives with
respect to parallel trade: let retailers ship goods ex post to the market where
demand is highest so that it pays them to order more inventory. Case (b)
can be viewed as a situation in which consumers in the two countries di⁄er in
their willingness to pay, but the manufacturer is uncertain about how much
they di⁄er. This situation requires that the retail price of the good adjusts ex
post to the realized willingness to pay. Without parallel trade, perfect com-
petition between retailers ensures that this adjustment takes place. Parallel
trade, however, interferes with this price adjustment because a rise in the re-
tail price tends to draw parallel imports into the country. In anticipation of
this, retailers will order less inventory, thereby reducing the manufacturer￿ s
pro￿t, as well as consumer surplus and welfare.
4 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that there are circumstances under which it pays
a manufacturer to allow retailers to engage in parallel trade. Speci￿cally,
parallel trade gives retailers an incentive to place larger orders than they
otherwise would. Moreover, parallel trade in these circumstances is generally
welfare improving. These results arise when four conditions are met: ￿rst,
retailers must place orders before they know the state of the demand; second,
the states of the demand are di⁄erent across markets; third, the products have
little value at the end of the demand period (or equivalently, it is costly to
maintain them as inventories); and fourth, we have the right type of demand
shock. In particular, we should expect to see parallel imports encouraged
by manufacturers in those industries in which consumers￿willingness to pay
is relatively similar across markets but for which there is uncertainty about
how many consumers will actually choose to buy. In short, these would
be products that are relatively standard but for one reason or another the
pro￿t with case-a (case-b) demand shocks. The same line of argument can be applied if we
have oligopolisitc retailers in each country: we only need to reinterpret marginal revenue
as residual marginal revenue to get the same results.
15manufacturers have a di¢ cult time anticipating the volume of sales. The
toy market seems like a good example of such market, but so are certain
segments of the fashion, motorcycle or even automobile markets, as well as
the electronics market to name just a few. In all these cases, we expect
parallel imports to change direction or at least to vary widely in volumes
from year to year. This is the case, for instance, in the North American
automobile market where the volume of parallel trade between Canada and
the US is today a fraction of what it was a few years ago (Automotive News,
2004b). The same is true in the US market of earth-moving equipment where,
as a result of the Asian crisis, the gray market share rose from 4.7% in 1997
to 19.5% in 1998 (Business Week, 1998).
It is important to note that there are other possible mechanisms that
would allow a manufacturer to reduce destructive competition. Three come
to mind: vertical integration with retailers, resale price maintenance (see De-
neckere et al., 1997), or a return policy for unsold inventories. The point of
the paper is that parallel trade constitutes a particularly simple mechanism
to achieve this goal. We would expect this to be true, especially if the manu-
facturer has less information than retailers about local market conditions, as
seems especially likely if the manufacturer is located overseas. Resale price
maintenance, for instance, would involve considerably more checking and
monitoring of retailers than allowing parallel imports. Similarly a manufac-
turer￿ s return policy is costly, not only because it might allow well informed
local retailers to shirk on sales e⁄ort, but also because a foreign manufacturer
may have no particular physical facilities in its export markets to handle re-
turned merchandise. Finally, vertical integration may be di¢ cult for a foreign
manufacturer again due to informational asymmetries, but also because the
market volume may be too small to justify the investment.
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